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Abstract
The aim of our paper is to discuss the problems of operationaliz-
ing the concept of a cost-of-living-index (COLI). For this purpose
we are rst undertaking a theoretical analysis of Diewerts theory of
superlative index numbers as one possible approach to approximate a
COLI. We show that Diewerts superlative index approach is arguable
in many points and that the approach requires restrictive assump-
tions which are not likely to be met in observed householdsbehav-
iour. To get a better idea about the deviation of observed households
behaviour from the neoclassical assumptions about utility maximizing
behaviour, we are estimating an Almost Ideal Demand System and a
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System with cross section micro data
from the German income and expenditure survey. Using the results
of the demand system estimations we calculate COLIs and compare
them with superlative index numbers and the Laspeyres price index.
1 Introduction
In some countries, especially the USA the prefered target of ination mea-
surement is the so called cost-of-living-index (COLI, or index of Konüs
PK0t ) as opposed to the traditional approach to dene a consumer price index
(CPI) which is based on a constant basketof goods (also known as cost
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of goods index, or COGI) as for example the well known Laspeyres price in-
dex. The COLI is the ratio of minimum costs c required to attain the same
utility level u under two price regimesgiven by the price vectors pt and p0
respectively, that is
PK0t (p0;pt; u (q) ; u) =
c (pt; u)
c (p0; u)
; (1)
The COLI thus compares the expenditures required for attaining the same
level of utility (well-being) rather than those required for buying the same
quantities of goods. In the COGI approach quantities q0 and qt are regarded
as exogenous (i.e. independent of prices) and given, as e.g. in the Laspeyres
price index
PL0t =
p0tq0
p00q0
(2)
or the Paasche price index
P P0t =
p0tqt
p00qt
(3)
whereas in the COLI context, q-vectors are said to be determined or
explainedby (rational) consumer behaviour as conventionally assumed in
microeconomic theory and therefore endogenous. For this reason the COLI
claims to possess a theoretical (microeconomic) foundation of an index func-
tion of a CPI. It is assumed that households are engaged in utility maximi-
sation subject to the restriction of a given total expenditure (or income) M
and a given vector p of prices. The COLI allows for substitutions among
the same goods in response to varying relative prices, while the COGI keeps
everything constant except prices. Therefore the COLI will in general display
lower ination rates, which not infrequently may be welcomed (politically),
and the di¤erence PL0t   PK0t > 0 is called substitution bias(of PL0t).
Those who advocate the COLI use to emphasise that the COLI enjoys
a theoretical justication or theoretical underpinning (in contrast to the
COGI which onlymay be justied by representing a weighted average of
price relatives and by the principle of pure price comparison according
to which the index is reective of price changes only). Note, however, that
(1) only denes the COLI PK0t but it does not give any hints about how to
compile this index in practice because the c-function (and the utility function
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from which it is derived) is not observable. Given that we cant know how
the amountof utility is related to the quantity of goods consumed we
have to nd ways to make the notion of a constant-utility-indexor COLI
nonetheless operationalor measurable. There are in principle three ways
proposed in order to accomplish this task
1. historically the rst approach was to dene upper and lower bounds
for a COLI (it is for example well known that under fairly general
conditions P P0t  PK0t  PL0t holds),
2. then some attempts were undertaken in order to estimate (economet-
rically) demand systems, that is systems of N demand equations
for N goods from which the theoretical cost-functions as numerator
and denominator of the COLI can be derived (and also the shape of
the Engel-curves and the estimates of some parameters such as various
elasticities. Those may be interesting regarding the economic inter-
pretation of the empirical results). However, as this approach turns out
to be extraordinarily di¢ cult to carry out in practice, it became more
and more popular, to
3. make use of the theory of superlative indicesdeveloped by [12][13]W.
Erwin Diewert (1976, 1978) according to which certain observable price
indices1 - each using the quantities in the base period as well as in
the current reference period as weights in a symmetric fashion - are
capable of approximating a COLI derived from a fairly general (or
exible) demand function.
The rst approach certainly is less promising from a practical point of
view of compiling an o¢ cial CPI on a monthly basis, because it can at best
provide intervals only rather than an exact numerical value. The second and
in particular the third approach may appear more pertinent and successful.
The focus of our paper therefore is on the second and third approach.
For this purpose we have undertaken both, a theoretical analysis of the as-
sumptions explicitly (or implicitly) underlying Diewerts theory of superlative
indices, and an empirical study of demand systems (using data taken from
1Such as PF0t =
p
PL0tP
P
0t (Fisher price index) or P
T
0t =
Q
( pitpi0 )
si (Törnqvist price
index) where si = 1=2(si0 + sit) is the arithmetic mean of the weights of the Laspeyres
and Paasche price index formulas.
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the o¢ cial German Family Budget Surveys EVS). To our knowledge there
are no studies of demand systems of a comparable broad scope (comparing
various systems) to be found in the literature to date.
2 The superlative index approach: assump-
tions and problems
2.1 Setting the stage
Given the immense problems with the Demand Systems Approach (DSA)
Diewerts Superlative Index Approach (SIA) was well accepted and hailed
everywhere on the part of the price statisticians as it promised to have solved
nally a seemingly insurmountable measurement problem. The SIA is gen-
erally seen as the rst and possibly (to this day at least) only method that
allows the unobservable COLI (or an approximation of it) to be compiled
validly in practice using observable price and quantity vectors only. The
message of the SIA is usually understood as follows: Diewert was able to
show that certain well known price indices P were exactfor a specic cost
function (and correspondingly quantity indices Q exact for a specic utility
function). This means that if preferences of a household are following a cer-
tain utility function (or cost function derived from it) the COLI takes the
form of a certain index (like Fisher P F , Törnqvist P T or Walsh PW ), which
then is said to be exactfor this particular type of utility or cost function.
If this function is exiblein a sense to be dened later, the corresponding
index is called superlative by Diewert. In fact P F , P T and PW are the
most prominent representatives of this family of superlativeprice indices.
In this part we try to show that this remarkable result of the SIA has
its price in that it requires some restrictive assumptions which are unlikely
to be met in reality and that its relevance notoriously seems to be greatly
exaggerated. Before going into detail of explicit and implicit assumptions
made in developing the SIA it seems to be pertinent to state right at the
outset how (we believe that) the message of superlative indicesprobably
is understood by the ordinary price statistician. It seems to us that in his
view the following ve statements are true
1. There are only small number of index function proved to be superlative
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as for example P F , P T or PW (and the corresponding quantity indices
QF , QT and QW of Fisher, Törnqvist and Walsh).
2. Hence to be superlative is a rare and most honourable distinction which
most of the hitherto familiar and popular indices like Laspeyres PL,
Paasche P P and so do not deserve.2
3. To be superlativemeans that it is distinctly shown that the index
in question is (approximately) equal to the COLI and thus valid for
any utility function whatsoever3 (and any consumer if he behaves ra-
tionally) which dispenses us once and for all from studying behaviour
consumer empirically .
4. It is in particular no longer relevant to study how the average household
responds to changes of relative prices by substituting away from goods
that became dearer. The so called substitution biasis correctly mea-
sured as di¤erence between a non-superlative index and a superlative
index, for example PL   P F .
5. Although the underlying COLI-Theory had been developed for the case
of one single household only and the compilation of a price index in
one stage only4 the more realistic many-households and multiple-stage
compilation case does not require fundamental changes of the SIA.
In what follows we attempt to show that this interpretation of Diewerts
SIA is false in all ve points and that the approach requires quite restrictive
assumptions which are not likely to be met in real householdsbehaviour.
Lacking realism of the theorys assumptions matters and ensues also that
2In a similar vein it is frequently argued that it is an advantage as such - and therefore
justication - of an index design (like for example the method of chain indices) over other
indices only because it comes closer to a superlative index than the other indices do.
3The notion of a exible function is widely understood as approximating closely
enough an arbitrary function (or simply any function one might think of) so that
there is no point in dealing any more with specic functions.
4 [15]Diewert (2001) is one of the rare occasions where Diewert explicitly discussed
problems (for a COLI) involved in the fact that statistical agencies compile (aggregate)
price indices in two or more stages in practice (using various component subindicesas
sub-indices on various levels of aggregation). He showed that indices like PF and PT satisfy
consistency in aggregation only approximately. He did not, however, refer to problems of
separability of utility functions that is to the microeconomic foundation of the subindices
as opposed to the overall index.
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the theorys relevance is much more limited than what is usually believed.
This is even more a point as the COLI claims precedence over all other
index approaches and index formulas just because it possesses a theoretical
foundationwhile other indices do not.5
A number of steps is needed in order to derive the result that a certain
index function is superlative. In each step some assumptions are implied.
We discuss assumptions in the sequence of these steps, beginning with some
most fundamental assumptions of the COLI theory and proceeding in the
way superlativityof distinct index function is proved.
To begin with (sec.2.2) it is assumed that households decide on their
purchases by maximising their utility. For this it is necessary that the vectors
q of quantities of goods and the as great as possible amountof utility
u are related to one another somehow. This leads to the notion of a utility
function u = f(q). As q is related to u it is maintained that quantities are
endogenous or explained in COLI framework and no longer assumed as
given or exogenousas they are in other index theories. However, a utility
function in turn requires some quite restrictive assumptions. We are going
to show how these general requirements of a utility function may be inferred
from rationalconsumer behaviour.
In doing so we are dealing so far only with the COLI in general. In order
to move in a further step to the more specic SIA topic we have to consider
specic functional forms for the utility function and related functions, like
the costs function. This will be done in sec.2.3 where we introduce two
specic functional forms used by Diewert when he derived some families of
superlative indices. There we also demonstrate how a functional form is
related to its corresponding price and quantity index and what is implied
when the form is called exible.
2.2 Preference formation and utility maximising (COLI
assumptions)
It is generally accepted that the SIA needs to presuppose that households are
engaged in utility maximisation. The COLI theory as basis of the SIA starts
with a single household. Before a utility function exists that can reasonably
5For [27]Triplett (2001) it is clear that the microeconomic theory underlying the COLI
is the only theory we have, and all other indices have no underlying conceptual framework.
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be maximised, a household6 must have preferences (predilections and dislikes)
and a preference order of quantity vectors q (or combinations of quantities
q of N commodities). Unlike a utility function f(q) the more fundamental
preference order only provides a ranking of commodity combinations in
ascending order of desirability (preference) where not yet numerical values
of the amount of utility u are assigned to vectors q0 = [q1 : : : qN ] as it is the
case in a utility function u = f(q). In order to provide a consistent ranking
the commodity combinations have to meet criteria that are anything but self
evident, viz. completeness (the ranking ought to comprise all possible com-
binations), transitivity (permitting a one dimensional order), non-satiation7
and continuity which in turn requires homogeneousgoods (innite divisi-
bility where quality remains constant). As to preference formation it is as-
sumed that a household feels desires and satisfaction independently of other
households, so that all sorts of imitation and emulation behaviour (as often
observed) are ruled out.
Moreover it is assumed that the household decides over quantities in a
rational and consistent manner. Maximisation of utility (under budget con-
strains) presupposes
1. the ability and willingness on the part of consumers to collect the nec-
essary informations about prices, availability in suitable outlets) and
to make the required changes in the consumption in response to chang-
ing relative prices (reaction is immediate and well informed, ideally the
information about the given supply is complete and always up to date);
2. the existence of a utility function (indi¤erence surface) which in turn
requires that certain mathematical conditions are met, and also
3. the existence of a budget constraint (isocost plane) where again some
assumptions are implicitly made and nally it is important to note that
the COLI model assumes, that
4. the utility function is constant over time and that households make
(possibly innitely small) changes in their consumption solely in re-
sponse to changing relative prices and not, for example because of
6It only later turns to the more complex COLI theory of many-households which is of
course closer related to the scope of a national CPI than the single household case.
7This means that for any combination of commodities there must exist at least one
other combination which is preferred to it.
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changes in tastes or constraints on the supply side8 or as a consequence
of other consumersdecisions.
Each of these assumptions is far from being a matter of course. It is in
the rst place not self-evident that households are engaged in utility maximi-
sation. Also unlikely is the prevalence of a constant utility function over all
goods and representative for all households serving as a precise description
of consumer decisions in quantitative terms.
Ad 1: The assumption amounts to postulating an arguably idealised (ex-
treme), innitely exible and active homo oeconomicus. The two Irish au-
thors [25]Murphy and Garvey (2005) found out that contrary to their most
plausible expectations, poor households were less adversely a¤ected by ina-
tion than the higher income groups. The received wisdom is that households
who are better o¤ have a greater range of choice among goods which are
not only necessities so that they are supposed to be more exible and more
inclined to substitute goods that became relatively dearer. However, surpris-
ingly their consumption pattern exhibited less exibility than the one of less
a­ uent consumers. The reason for this paradox seems to be that the rich may
have been discouraged by the disutilities and (psychic) costs of search activ-
ities involved in constantly rationally rearranging ones consumption. They
may be interested in avoiding inconvenience and they are in the comfortable
situation that they can a¤ord it. On the other hand the relatively poor may
be forced to be more exible due to their disadvantaged economic situation.
Hence preferences and exibility may in actual fact be a product of ones
economic situation rather than exogenously determined. Not only prefer-
ences but also the propensity to actively rearrange consumption in response
to price movement can be income or class determined.
Ad 2: In order to transform a preference order into a real valued utility
function u = f(q) according to which utility u depends only on the vector q
of quantities of market purchased goods we have to assume a metric variable
u and that marginal changes of quantities can be made that will sensibly
a¤ect u. This implies that the function f(q) has got to be a continuous,
8For example a good is no longer available or o¤ered only with some new features not
wanted by the consumer. Ideally none of the phenomena that characterises a dynamic
market should take place: goods disappear and new goods emerge on the market, quality
changes etc. For all those reasons consumers may be forced to involuntarily change their
demand induced by activities on the supply side of the market.
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increasing (in elements of q), quasi-concave9 (to establish an unequivocal
maximum), and twice continuously di¤erentiable function over all parts of
its domain. These assumptions are known as regularity conditions and
they are reconcilable only with a limited number of functional forms so that
not all imaginable functions are eligible for representing f(q).
For the COLI theory it su¢ ces to postulate such quite general proper-
ties of a utility function f(q), however, for the SIA it is necessary to be
more specic regarding the functional form of f(q).10 The problem with
utility maximising is that we cannot be sure whether or not households in
fact perform this optimisation exercise in their decision making.11 The SIA
rationale, however, decisively rests on the assumption that observed expen-
ditures are resulting from utility maximisation. More specic it is assumed
that the scalar product p0sqs =
P
i pisqis (i = 1; : : : ; N and s = 0; t) is equal
to the value of the cost function12 c (ps; us) in both periods s = 0 and s = t.
Interestingly from the mere denition of c as minimum costs (expenditure)
follows that p0tq0  c (pt; u0) and p00qt  c (p0; ut) and therefore
PL0t =
p0tq0
p00q0
 c (ps; u0)
p00q0
=
c (pt; u0)
c (p0; u0)
(4)
and
P P0t =
p0tqt
p00qt
 p
0
tqt
c (p0; ut)
=
c (pt; ut)
c (p0; ut)
: (5)
In each equation the rightmost term is a COLI referring to a utility level of
u0 and ut respectively.13 It is common practice to refer not only to the same
9This is a curvature condition for f(q). A concave utility function means somewhat
simplied that average quantities of all goods are preferred to extreme or one-sided con-
sumption (0% or 100% of the budget devoted to one specic good).
10We consider these additional assumptions in sec. 2.3.
11It is indeed an advantage the econometric demand-system-approach (DSA) enjoys over
the SIA that empirical results (like ours) indicating a poor goodness of t of the respective
models to data may be taken as a hint that household possibly are not acting as utility
maximiser so that the theoretic assumptions may not be realistic.
12That is the minimum costs (expenditure) of achieving a utility level us under a pre-
vailing price vector ps (or to put it di¤erently we chose that very vector q of quantities for
which the expenditure qps under the price regime of period s is a minimum). A unique
value c of c (ps; us) requires that the above mentioned conditions are met concerning the
utility function us = f(qs) from which the function c (ps; us) is derived.
13This is in the literature sometimes called Laspeyres-Konüs and Paasche-Konüs (price)
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utility function f(q) but also to same value u of this function (u = f(q)) in
both numerator and denominator of the COLI (price) index which thus is
dened as equation (1) in the introduction. It is important to note that the
assumption that households utility maximisation on the part of the house-
holds is crucial. Otherwise we could not equate p0sqs = c (ps; us) and bring
the observed indices PL and P P into play and relate them to the unobserved
COLI. Once utility maximisation does not take place a superlative index will
no longer approximate the COLI.
Ad 3: In order to dene the budget constraint (or isocost plane) it is
necessary to specify how total consumption expenditure14 M is related to
income15 and the commodity prices p1; : : : ; pN are generally assumed as being
determined exogenously. Households are assumed to be price takers which
means prices are given, independent of quantities purchased and the same
for all households.16 Also M is given which means that we do not explain a
households time allocation and labour supply on the basis of decisions over
leisure time tL and working hours tW with reference to a utility function
f(q; t) where t = tL + tW .
Along with the above mentioned regularity conditions concerning f(q)
such assumptions are needed in order to have a linear budget constraint
otherwise we would run into di¢ culties establishing an optimum as a unique
tangency point of the isocost plane with the indi¤erence surface. Other
necessary assumptions are
 Due to limited resources (nite income) an important constraint is also
index respectively. The assumption of homotheticpreferences introduced later is valu-
able as a simplication in that it then does not matter to which period the utility level
refers (so that Laspeyres-Konüs and Paasche-Konüs coincide).
14One may make a distinction between consumption (creating utility) and consumption
expenditure. The di¤erence is not only time but also household production as many
purchases are subject to a signicant amount of processing (e.g. cooking) within the
households. Use of goods must also be distinguished from acquisition of goods. It is
assumed that goods are acquired by purchases and not received as payments in kind, gifts
or so.
15The familiar assumption her is that all income is spent for purchases. This rules
out that households take care of future consumption by saving. We then have a more
comfortable single period utility maximisation problem only.
16 [14]Diewert (2000) considered at length a model in which he relaxed the assumption
that prices are constant across households. The resulting equations (relating a disag-
gregated Laspeyres or Paasche index to the usualLaspeyres or Paasche index) are quite
complicated.
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that budget shares of all N goods ought to add up to unity (100%).
 The (linear) budget constraint is a function (inM and p) which should
be homogenous of degree zero inM and p (to ensure that no money il-
lusionprevails). This assumption is needed to make sure that only rel-
ative prices rather than absolute prices matter when households make
rearrangements (substitutions) in their consumption.
Ad 4: It is important to note that these substitutions are made on a con-
stant (invariant) utility function solely in response to changes in the relative
prices (over which the household has no command). To increase or decrease
ones demand should not result from changing tastes or reacting to activi-
ties on the supply side. Ideally higher or lower income should not inuence
the preferences order.17 However, in reality tastes are constantly changing
with the passage of time and they are also a¤ected from ageing, technology
and supply. The set of goods over which quantied preferences (that is util-
ity values) are dened is varying, new goods emerge an old ones disappear
from the market. In reality changes in consumption patterns are clearly not
attributable only to decisions on the demand side of the market.
In summary all these assumptions are inherent in the COLI approach on
the basis of which also both approaches, SIA and DSA are built. It is by no
means less realistic to make the assumption of a constant (and observable)
basket of goods than to assume a constant function f(q) relating quantities
to the unobservable utility. Furthermore we have seen that to legitimately
call the COLI approach theoretically superior to the COGI approach depends
on the realism of the underlying theory of consumer behaviour. And this in
turn is contingent on quite a few conditions which are not likely to be met
in real situations.
2.3 Functional forms and their corresponding indices
(the SIA assumptions)
We now come to additional assumptions needed in Diewerts SIA. The pre-
ceding section made clear that to be eligible as a utility function (and as the
corresponding cost function), or more general as an aggregator function
is not easy. To serve as a utility function f(q) the function rather needs to
17This refers to the issue of homotheticpreferences we will discuss shortly.
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meet the quite restrictive regularity conditionsat least in relevant parts of
its domain. It therefore cannot be any arbitrary function.
Before embarking on a discussion of suitable functional forms for f(q) it
may be interesting to note that [5]Barnett and Choi (2008) called in question
Diewerts way to concentrate only on functions that exist in an algebraically
closed form. They contend that there are many functions that can only
be tabulated18 and evaluated by using partial sums of series of (Taylor)
expansionshis method spans only a strict subset of the general class(of
superlative indices) in question.19 They also showed that all indices of the
class of log-change indices20 (of which P T is a member) are superlative.
Note that even if we conne ourselves to those functions for which a closed
and parameterised algebraic form exists we may nd an innite number of
superlative index formulas of which only a small subset is known and capable
of a plausible interpretation.
To develop a theory of superlative indices and make use of the SIA four
steps are needed:
1. A functional form has to be found which complies with all assumptions
needed to reect rational consumer behaviour, and
2. the price and quantity index corresponding to (exactfor) this func-
tional form have to be derived, and
3. it has to be demonstrated that the functional form in question is ex-
iblein the denition of Diewert, and nally
4. as there is an abundance of superlative indices it is desirable to have
some guidance in making a choice among these formulas.
18Examples they referred to are trigonometric or hyperbolic functions.
19 [6]Barnett et al. (2003) therefore also wondered why only a small number of index
numbers (of a potentially innite number) have so far been found and maintained that
the search process of an index number which is exact for a given functional form or - the
other way round - for a functional form which is exact for a given index function is not
yet formalised (No simple procedure has been found for either direction. For example
the miniex Laurent aggregator function, originated by [7]Barnett and Lee (1985) . . . , is
known to be second order, but no one has succeeded in nding the index number, that
can track it exactly).
20See [29]von der Lippe (2007), pp. 226 - 254. These indices are also called (e.g. in
[5]Barnett and Choi (2008)) Theil Sato Indices.
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Ad 1: It is useful to consider homothetic21 or linear homogeneous utility
functions as an interesting and convenient sub-set of utility functions. A
function g(x1; :::; xn) is called homogeneous of degree r if
g(x1; :::; xn) = 
rg(x1; :::; xn): (6)
The analytic merit of linear (r = 1) homogeneity is that
c (p; u) = uc(p) = f(q)c(p); (7)
where c(p) =c (p; 1) is the unit cost function (minimum cost to ac-
quire a utility level of u = 1)22 which provides an enormous simplication.
Homotheticity implies that the COLI is independent of the utility level and
therefore the same for all income classes. Moreover all goods have unitary in-
come elasticities, Engel curves (consumed quantities q as function of income)
are straight lines through the origin23 and expenditure shares wi (i = 1; ::; N)
are una¤ected by changes in income (they are - as desired in the COLI the-
ory - solely reective of changes in relative prices). However, there is an
overwhelming amount of empirical evidence contradicting homotheticity of
preferences ([4]Barnett (1983), p. 218), so that the assumption of homo-
theticity is generally regarded as highly unrealistic. On the other hand the
assumption is extremely convenient. Just as the value index V0t is decom-
posed in a price and quantity index, P0t and Q0t respectively
V0t =
p0tqt
p00q0
= P0tQ0t; (8)
called product test, or weak factor reversal test24, and in a similar
manner V0t is usually factored in the economic index as follows
21It is common to make a distinction between homothetic and non-homothetic
utility functions. A utility function f is dened (by Shephard) as homothetic if it can
be written as a monotonic transformation of a linearly homogeneous function. However
for all practical purposes it is tolerable to use homotheticand linear homogeneousas
synonyms (like [16]Diewert did, p.6, footnote 8; this seems to be justied, see also [21]Kats
(1970)).
22Diewert has shown that c(p) and f(q) satisfy the same regularity conditions.
23In this respect quasi-homotheticpreferences are more general in the fact that the
Engel curves need not be forced through the origin([4]Barnett (1983), p.217).
24The (strict) factor reversal test requires the same functional form for P and Q (in-
terchanging prices p and quantities q in the price index P results in the quantity index Q
and vice versa).
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V0t =
p0tqt
p00q0
=
c(pt; ut)
c(p0; u0)
; (9)
assuming utility maximisation in both periods and using the homothetic-
ity assumption
utc (pt)
u0c (p0)
=
f(qt)
f(q0)
 c(pt)
c(p0)
; (10)
where the term (the ratio of utility levels) is said to be the economic
quantity index, while the second factor is called economic price indexor
simply COLI.
In his theory of superlative indices Diewert studied in particular only two
functional forms for f(q) and (derived therefrom) the cost function (we quote
the latter only), viz.
1. the quadratic mean of order r utility and cost function
cr (p) =
 X
i
X
j
bijp
r=2
it p
r=2
jt
!1=r
= (p0Bp)1=r (11)
where p =
h
p
r=2
1 :::p
r=2
N
i
the coe¢ cient bij of B = B0 in the quadratic form
p0Bp have to meet certain restrictions, and
2. the normalised quadratic cost function ([17]Diewert (2009), pp. 18 -
23)
cNQ (p) = p0b+
1
2
p0Ap
0p (12)
where the scalar 0p performs a sort of normalisation and again coe¢ -
cients a and b are appropriately restricted. Both models are fairly general.
The rst nests the
 homogeneous quadratic function (r = 2) for which Fishers ideal
index is exact,
 the (homogeneous) translog function (r ! 0)
ln c0 (p) = 0 +
X
i
i ln pi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
ij ln pi ln pj (13)
for which the Törnqvist index is exact,
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 the generalised linear utility function (r = 1) f(q) = a0p with the
corresponding general Leontief unit cost function c (p) = b0p and the
CES function with suitable parameter restrictions (aij = bij = 0 8
i 6= j) so that c (p) = a0 (
P
i aip
r
i )
1=r.
A non-homothetic variant of (13) is given by ([17]Diewert (2009), p. 24)
ln c0 (p; u) = 0 +
X
i
i ln pi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
ij ln pi ln pj (14)
+0 ln (u) +
X
i
i ln pi ln (u) +
1
2
00 (ln (u))
2 :
Obviously with vanishing  coe¢ cients (14) specialises to the homothetic
cost function (13). There is not much in the ways of economic theory and
interpretation that can be said about why one functional form should be
preferred over another one.25
Ad. 2: With a given functional form the price and quantity index has to
be found which is exact for it. For example [17]Diewert (2009) has shown
that the function
P r=20t =
c(pt)
c(p0)
=
p0tBpt
p0tBpt
; (15)
where p = [p1:::pN ] coincides with Fishers ideal price index P r=20t = P
F
0t .
Hence P F is exact for the homogeneous quadraticfunctional form. Corre-
spondingly the Fishers quantity index QF is equal to
Qr=20t =
ut
u0
=
f(qt)
f(q0)
:
In a similar manner Diewert has shown that the Törnqvist price index is
exact for the translog cost function (13).26 The general form of a price index
exact for quadratic mean of order r functional form is given by
25 [28]Turvey (1999), an ingrained opponent of the COLI approach said Writers on this
[i.e. COLI] theory express no views of which functional form is most realistic. More
about purely formal criteria in making a choice among functional forms can be found in
[22]Lau (1986).
26He did not consider the Törnqvist quantity index. Note that the Törnqvist index does
not satisfy factor reversibility. The index function even fails the weaker product test.
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P r0t =
"X
i
wi0

pit
pi0
r=2#1=r "X
i
wit

pit
pit
 r=2# 1=r
; (16)
if r 6= 0 and wit denoting expenditure shares of commodities i = 1; : : : ; N
in period t = 0; t. This constitutes a family of innitely many superlative
(price) indices for  1 < r < +1. Accordingly if r = 0 we get
P r=00t =
Y
i

pit
pi0
wi0+wit
2
= P T0t: (17)
The corresponding superlative quantity indices are gained by simply sub-
stituting qit=qi0 for pit=pi0 It is important to note that there are an innite
number of superlative indices on the basis of the quadratic mean of order
r. This functional form, however, requires homothetic preferences. Using
the non-homothetic cost function (14) Diewert could demonstrate that the
Törnqvist index is exact for the utility level u =
p
u0ut. For other levels
~u 6= u the (no less) superlative price index c(pt; ~u)=c(p0; ~u) will di¤er from
P T . So the SIA involves occasionally some additional assumptions. They
may be without a doubt plausible, however not at all cogent. In this case of
non-homotheticity27 it is an assumption about the absolute level (amount)
of utility that had to be introduced. Another situation where such an
assumption is involved is [17]Diewerts (2009) nding (pp. 21 -23) that
a) PA0t =
1
2
 
PL0t + P
P
0t

(18)
or
b) PH0t =

1
2
 
PL0t
 1
+
1
2
 
P P0t
 1 1
(19)
is exact for the normalised quadratic cost function (12) and therefore
again superlative. However, this applies only if we set
a)  = qt and
b)  = q0 respectively.
27The result (of Diewert) concerning the index PT of Törnqvist is to our knowledge the
only proof of superlativity where the (notoriously unrealistic) assumption of homothetic
preferences is being relaxed.
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The corresponding quantity indices are a) harmonic mean QH0t (corre-
sponding to PA0t)
28 and b) arithmetic mean QA0t.
Note that the vector  can also be specialised in a great number of other
ways. We tried for example  = (qt + q0)=2 and got another superlative
price index for which, however, we could not nd an obvious (or economically
luminous) interpretation, e.g. in terms of well known index formulas, like PL,
P P or so.
It is also remarkable that an index function can be exact for di¤erent
functional forms for the cost (or utility) function (and there possibly only
for certain restrictions concerning the parameters) and conversely the same
cost (or utility) function t to di¤erent superlative index formulas. This
may be seen as a challenge for an economic interpretation of the meaning of
superlative.
Diewert dened another innitely large class of superlative indices by
making use of the product test, dened in (8), showing that if P0t is superla-
tive this applies also to the corresponding indirectquantity index. Likewise
if Q0t is superlative the corresponding indirect price index ~P0t = V0t=Q0t is
also superlative.29 Direct and indirect indices coincide whenever the index
function is factor reversible which is the case with Fishers index.
In this way (via considering indirect indices) also the Walsh index formula
received the honour of generating superlative indices. The quadratic mean
of order r = 1 superlative price index
P r=10t =
"X
i
wi0

pit
pi0
1=2#

"X
i
wit

pit
pit
 1=2# 1
(20)
= V0t=
P
qit
p
pi0pitP
qi0
p
pi0pit
= V0t=Q
W
0t ;
turns out to be the indirect price index of Walsh ~PW0t = P
r=1
0t this index
is also superlative. Note that the indirect Walsh price index di¤ers from the
direct Walsh price index
28This index is said to originate from Drobisch in Germany, however Diewert refers to
Bowley and Sidgwick.
29Interestingly Diewert did not make use of such considerations in terms of indirect
indices in a consistent manner. One may for example wonder why the indirect quantity
index of Törnqvist V=PT is not superlative.
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PW0t =
P
pit
p
qi0qitP
pi0
p
qi0qit
6= ~PW0t = P r=10t : (21)
So strictly speaking it is the indirect, rather than the direct Walsh index
which is superlative (a quadratic mean of order r = 1 index). In a similar
vein the quadratic mean of order r = 1 superlative quantity index is given
by
Qr0t =
"X
i
wi0

qit
qi0
r=2#1=r "X
i
wit

qit
qit
 r=2# 1=r
; (22)
so that forr = 1 we get ~QW0t = V0t=P
W
0t = Q
r=1
0t saying that the indirect
Walsh quantity index is again a superlative index (now a quantity index).
For pairs of indices satisfying the product test there is no di¤erence between
a direct and an indirect index. Also V0t = QH0tP
A
0t = P
H
0tQ
A
0t so that all four
indices are superlative (be it directly or indirectly).
Ad. 3: For a price (quantity) index P (Q) to be superlative requires
not only that P is exact for c(p) and Q for f(q) but also that f(q), and
c(p) respectively is a exible functional form. What is meant by exible.
According to Diewert a twice continuously di¤erentiable function f(q) is
exible if it provides a second order approximation to another function f (q)
around the point q, meaning that the level and all of rst and second order
partial derivatives of the two functions coincide at q.30 More specic one
may write (in analogy to [5]Barnett and Choi (2008), p.4)31:
f(q) = f (q);
@f
@q
jq=q =
@f 
@q
jq=q and
@2f
@q@q0
jq=q =
@2f 
@q@q0
jq=q (23)
Instead of anotherfunction f  we also nd the notion of an arbitrary
30 [16]Diewert (2008), p. 52. [17]Diewert (2009), p. 13, also stresses the requirement
that q (and q*) need to belong to the regularity region(of the utility function). What
is said about f(q) and q* of course also applies mutatis mutandis to the function c(p)
around the point p*. See also [3]Barnett (1983b)for di¤erent denitions of second order
approximation.
31For a graphical interpretation see also [29]von der Lippe (2007), p. 109. It is beyond
the scope of our paper to demonstrate exemplary what has to be done in order to show
that a specic functional form in fact is exiblein the denition of Diewert.
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linear homogenous function.32 It is important to note that the approxima-
tion is evaluated at the point q* of the two function in question, so that the
situation may well di¤er substantially at other points. Furthermore exibil-
ity is not the only desirable property of a functional form. There are other
equally important criteria which may not be reconcilable with exibility.33
Hence exibility which makes an exact index superlative seems to be a
purely formal criterion for which a luminous economic interpretation is
lacking. Moreover the criterion should also be set against other more restric-
tive and unrealistic assumptions made in the course of proving the superla-
tivity of an index formula. One may for example argue, that homothetic
preferences are assumed in most of the SIA results (for example concerning
Fishers index P F ) such that the income level is irrelevant for the choice of a
vector qt as opposed to q0 which is undisputedly unrealistic.34 This implies
to focus exclusively on the substitution bias (of a non-superlative index as by
contrast to a superlative one) while in the case of non-homothetic preferences
the combined income and substitution bias may well o¤set the substitution
bias.35 So to be adequate for non-homothetic preferences may be more valu-
32 [16]Diewert (2008), p. 15. [22]Lau (1986), p. 1539) emphasised explicitly the ability
. . . to approximate arbitrary but theoretically consistent behaviour through an appro-
priate choice of the parameters. Aside from sounding a bit contradictory (theoretical
consistency or regularity is anything but arbitrary) this denition of exibility un-
derscores the idea of having left a su¢ cient number of free parameters to reect di¤erent
decisions of consumers and to generate for example di¤erent values for certain elasticities,
expenditure shares, rates of substitution etc. Accordingly he wrote so that . . . their
own and cross price elasticities are capable of assuming arbitrary values . . . subject only
to the requirements of theoretical consistency (p. 1540). Arguing that the normalised
quadratic function is exible Diewert also pointed out that it has the minimal number of
free parameters that is required . . . to be exible.([17]Diewert (2009), p. 20)
33 [22]Lau (1986) lists ve criteria. These are in addition to exibility theoretical con-
sistency, a (wide) domain of applicability (whether consistency is globally, over the whole
domain, or only locally valid), computational facility and factual conformity (according to
which he rejects for example all those functional forms which generate linear Engel curves,
as this appears to him highly unrealistic).
34Constant returns to scale is the production theory counterpart to homotheticity in
consumption theory.
35This is in principle an argument of [18]Dumagan and Mount (1997). Their theoretical
and empirical work amounts in no small measure to a vindication of the Laspeyres formula.
They also criticise from the point of view of microeconomic theory the usage of both weights
q0 as well as qt (or expenditure shares wi0 as well as wit) in a symmetrical fashion which
interestingly - at least to our knowledge - takes place in all superlative index formulas.
There is no superlative index which refers to the weights of one of the two periods only.
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able than to be able to provide a second order approximation (rather than a
rst order only as is that case with PL).
Ad. 4: As there are quite a few equally superlative indices it seems
desirable to make an informedchoice among these index formulas. In this
respect it is often believed that all superlative indices approximate each other
su¢ ciently close because Diewert has shown that all the superlative index
formulae . . . approximate each other to the second order around any point
where the two price vectors . . . are equal and where the two quantity vectors
. . . are equal([14]Diewert (2000), p. 61). This result is generally understood
as justifying the view that it does not matter much which superlative index
is taken as they will display a similar order of magnitude for whichever data.
The problem, however, is that the equal (or proportional) price and quantity
point([14]Diewert (2000), p.65) where pt = p0 and qt = q0 respectively36
is relatively uninteresting. This is so because in that case all reasonable
indices will be identically  anyway. Moreover [20]Hill (2006) found out that
the approximation theorem referring to the quadratic mean of order r (which
is a exible functional form for all values of r), does not apply to extreme
values of r. It works well in the range 0  r  2 but it can yield with a
skewed distribution of price relatives and jrj ! 1 di¤erences between P r
and P rwhich may be much greater than the di¤erence PL   P P . So Hill
concluded that the economic approach does not by itself solve the index
number problem, since it does not tell us which superlative index should be
used.
In summary we may conclude that the COLI-theory in general and the
SIA (built on this theoretical foundation) in particular need a number of
quite restrictive assumptions so that in the perennial question of the realism
of the theorys assumptions ([27]Triplett (2001), p. 318) in our view the
COLI may well come out at the losing end compared to the COGI. There are
also other aspects we could not deal with here, that may cast doubt on the
general belief of COLI advocates, that the Laspeyres index falls far behind
the Fisher index for example. The superlative quantity index for example
plays a somewhat dubious role. When QF0t > 1 is superlative this means that
the standard of living (level of utility) increased because QF0t approximates
ut=u0 = f (qt) =f (q0). On the other hand P F0t measures the minimum cost of
maintaining a constant level of utility.37 The relevance (representativity) of it
36The equalpoint is of course the case  = 1.
37It is the word minimumwhich Triplett seems to have forgotten when he levies the
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might be questioned when ut > u0 just like is being criticised for its constant
basket which is constantly becoming unrepresentative and irrelevant with the
passage of time. Other vexing problems with the COLI theory are problems
involved in
 proceeding from the single household case to the multiple household
case38, and
 in justifying the usual multistage index compilation of o¢ cial statis-
tics, not only in terms of aggregation properties of index functions39 in
terms of sub-utility maximisation as it would be required in the COLI
framework.
However this would go beyond the topic of this paper.
3 Demand Systems
After having analysed Diewerts Superlative Index Approach, we will now
turn to the Demand Systems Approach to approximate the COLI. There is
more than one demand system in accordance with the usual assumptions of
the utility maximising household. Hence a choice has to be made among a
number of functional forms, each of which renders specic functions for the
indirect utility function or the cost function and above all for the budget
shares. This choice may be oriented at various desirable properties of the
respective functional forms. The specic regression functions may for ex-
ample comply with the (microeconomic) regularity requirementsof utility
and demand functions only within a more or less wide range of possible val-
ues for the parameters of the function rather than globally. In addition
following argument against the Laspeyres price index PL ([27]Triplett (2001), p. 324):Any
index di¤erent from the COLI means that the utility level is not constant such that sta-
bilising the Laspeyresby the monetary authorities implies diminishing living standard.
However PL traces the cost of buying the same basket of goods which of course involves
the same level u given a constant utility function. It is only the cost c(pt; u0) which will
by denition be smaller than p00qt.
38The question which of the two weighting schemes (plutocratic or democratic) is prefer-
able is still not resolved.
39For example Diewert discussed this type of considerations only in [14]Diewert (2000),
p. 63¤.
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to this criterion of a su¢ ciently wide domain of applicability there are
some other properties that ought to be considered, such as exibility40 or
computational facility and factual conformity41. As regards the crite-
ria for functional forms mentioned above the Almost Ideal Demand System
(abbreviated by the nowadays unfortunate acronym AIDS) of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) and the more general system QUAIDS (quadratic AIDS)
of [2]Banks et al. (1997) represent a fair compromise.
3.1 Almost Ideal Demand System
The starting-point of [11]Deaton and Muellbauers (1980) AlDS is a cost
function of the price independent generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) class
of preferences:
ln c (p;u) = (1  u) ln a (p) + u ln b (p) ; (24)
where the utility level u generally lies between 0 (subsistence level) and
1 (bliss point) and where
ln a (p) = 0 +
NX
i=1
i ln pi +
1
2
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
ij ln pi ln pj (25)
and
ln b (p) = ln a (p) + 0
NY
i=1
p
i
i : (26)
Filling in equations (25) and (26) in (24) results in the AIDS cost function
40Diewert denes exibility in his Lecture Notes (ch. 4) as follows: it is a function
f(q) that can provide a second order approximation to an arbitrary function f* around
any (strictly positive) point q* in the class of the linearly homogenous functions.And by
second order approximation is meant: A twice di¤erentiable function f(q) . . . can provide
a second order approximation to another such function f*(q) around the point q* if the
level and all of the rst and second order partial derivatives of the two functions coincide
at q*.
41According to [22]Lau (1986) this is not met if for example the system can only yield
linear Engel-curves (which e.g. applies to AIDS as opposed to QUAIDS). Also Lau had
shown that it is not possible to reconcile the above mentioned criteria so that a compromise
is called for.
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ln c (p;u) = 0 +
NX
i=1
i ln pi +
1
2
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
ij ln pi ln pj + u0
NY
i=1
p
i
i ; (27)
which is homogeneous of degree one in prices p if the following parameter
restrictions hold:
NX
i=1
i = 1;
NX
i=1
i = 0; (28)
NX
i=1
ij = 0 8j;
NX
j=1
ij = 0 8i; (29)
ij = 

ji: (30)
By multiplying both sides of Shephards Lemma @c (p;u) =@pi = qi with
pi=c (p;u) we get
@ ln c (p;u)
ln pi
=
piqi
c (p;u)
= wi; (31)
so that we can derive a budget share equation from (31):
wi = i +
NX
j=1
ij ln pj + iu0
NY
i=1
p
i
i : (32)
As for a utilitiy maximizing household c (p;u) = M , we can derive the
utiltiy level u via the indirect utility function:
v (p;M) =
ln c (p;u)  ln a (p)
ln b (p)  ln a (p) = u: (33)
Putting the utiltiy level u from equation (33) in (32), we get the common
AIDS budget share equation:
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wi = i +
NX
j=1
ij ln pj + i

ln c (p;u)  ln a (p)
ln b (p)  ln a (p)

0
NY
i=1
p
i
i
wi = i +
NX
j=1
ij ln pj + i (lnM   ln a (p))
wi = i +
NX
j=1
ij ln pj + i ln

M
P

;
(34)
where P is a price aggregator
lnP = 0 +
NX
i=1
i ln pi +
1
2
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
ij ln pi ln pj (35)
and where
ij =
1
2
 
ij + 

ji

: (36)
The parameter restrictions (28) - (30) of the cost function (27) should in
general also hold for the budget share equation (34). Only the restrictions
(29) and (30) have to be changed slightly due to equation (36) to:
NX
i=1
ij = 0 8j; (37)
and
ij = ji: (38)
As [11]Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) show, adding-up (
P
wi = 1) re-
quires the parameter restrictions (28) und (37) to be satised, the restriction
(37) ensures the homogeneity of degree 0 in p und M of the budget share
equation (34) and restriction (38) is the requirement for a symmetric Slutsky
matrix. The AIDS can either be estimated by directly imposing the re-
strictions (28) - (30) or by testing the restrictions after having estimated the
model without restricitions. Taking the parameter restricitons (28), (37) and
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(38) into account, the number of parameters to estimate of the AIDS budget
share equation (34) can be determined using equation N (N   1) =2+2N 2.
[24]Lewbel (1991) extends [19]Gormans (1981) famous Engel curve rank
denition and denes the rank of a demand system to be the maximum
dimension of the function space spanned by the engel curves of the demand
system. Following this denition, [23]Lewbel (1987) shows that the AIDS is
a rank two demand system which implies that it has linear Engel curves (not
necessarily through the origin).
3.2 Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS)
Several studies, like for example Lewbel (1991), Blundell et al. (1993) and
Banks et al. (1997), found - at least for some goods - empirical evidence for
non-linear Engel curves. So Banks et al. (1997) extended the AIDS model to
allow budget shares being quadratic in expenditure. The underlying indirect
utility function of this rank three Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
(QUAIDS) in its general form
v (p;M) =
"
lnM   ln a(p)
b(p)
 1
+  (p)
# 1
; (39)
is equivalent to a general indirect utility function of a PIGLOG demand
system supplemented by the homogeneous of degree 0 in p function  (p).
Using the already known form 25 from the AIDS for ln a(p) together with
b(p) =
Q
p
i
i and  (p) =
P
i ln pi we get from equation 39 to the specic
indirect utility function of the QUAIDS
v (p;M) =
24 lnM   0  Pk k   12PkPj kj ln pk ln pjQ
i p
i
i
! 1
+
X
i
i ln pi
35 1 ;
(40)
and to the cost function
ln c (p;u) = 0 +
X
k
k ln pk +
1
2
X
k
X
j
kj ln pk ln pj +
lnu
Q
i p
i
i
1  lnuPi i ln pi :
(41)
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By applying Shephards Lemma on (41), we receive the QUAIDS budget
share equations
wi = i +
X
j
ij ln pj + i ln

M
P

+
iQ
k p
k
k

ln

M
P
2
; (42)
where we are using P of the form (35) instead of a(p) to ease the com-
parison between AIDS and QUAIDS. To be consistent with the neoclassical
assumptions of consumer theory, the QUAIDS has to fulll the following
parameter restrictions:X
i
i = 1;
X
i=1
i = 0;
X
i=1
i = 0;
X
i
ij = 0 8j; (43)
X
j
ij = 0 8i; (44)
ij = ji: (45)
The restrictions of (43) ensures adding-up, the restriction (44) is required
for homogeneity of degree 0 in p andM of equation (42) and restriction (45) is
a necessary condition for a symmetric Slutsky matrix. Taking the parameter
restricitons (43), (44) and (45) into account, the number of parameters to
estimate of the QUAIDS budget share equation (42) can be determined using
equation N (N   1) =2+3N  3 (number of parameters of the AIDS plus the
N   1 additional i parameters of the QUAIDS). Compared to the AIDS,
the expenditure and price elasticities of the QUAIDS can vary with the level
of total expenditure M, indicating the higher exibilitxy of the QUAIDS. In
the QUAIDS it is for example possible, that the same good is identied as
luxury good for a household with low total expenditure and as a necessity
good. A drawback of using the QUAIDS is the danger of obtaining tted
budget shares for high total expenditure values that fall outside the [0; 1]
domain of denition.
By having a look on the budget share equations (34) and (42) of the
AIDS and QUAIDS, it is obvious, that the AIDS is nested in the QUAIDS
(AIDS is the special case of the QUAIDS if i = 0 for all i). This is a
big advantage because we can easily compare the goodness of t of the two
models concerning our observed household data described in the next section.
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4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the sample survey of household income
and expenditure, abbreviated by its German initials EVS (Einkommens- und
Verbrauchsstichprobe).42 The EVS is part of the German system of house-
hold budget surveys, which consists additional to the EVS of the annually
conducted current household budget survey (Laufenden Wirtschaftsrechnun-
gen, LWR). The EVS is a cross-section household survey, conducted every
ve years that started in 1962/63 in West Germany and was extended since
1993 to East Germany. As statistical unit a household is dened as a group
of persons whose command over income is shared, independent of their kin
relationship. By a net sample (fully completed questionnaires) of 55,110 vol-
untarily participating households in 2008, the EVS is the largest survey of its
kind in the European Union. The EVS is a quota and not a random sample
so that statistical errors cannot be calculated in the theoretically exact way.
The annual current population survey of Germany, the Microcensus, serves
as a benchmark for recruiting the participants, who earn a small honorarium.
Some of the quotas cannot be achieved completely, so that a nal weighting
has to be conducted. To publish results on the federal state level, the EVS
sample is weighted according to the criteria type of household, social po-
sition of the households reference person and income bracket for each
federal state using the current Microcensus results.
The EVS consists of four parts:
1. Initial household interview, in which the socio-demographic informa-
tion about every household member, the overall housing situation and
the endowment with durable consumer goods are enquired.
2. An appendix to the initial household interview evaluating the nancial
assets and debts of the household.
3. A household book, containing all kinds of income - including public
and in-kind transfers - and expenditures on all categories of private
consumption, has to be kept for three month.
4. A sub-sample of 20% of the participating households has to keep for one
month another household book (detailed log book) in which all expen-
42For a comprehensive description of the EVS see [26]Statistisches Bundesamt (2005).
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ditures and purchased quantities on food, alcoholic and non-alcoholic
drinks and tobacco products have to be noted in absolute detail.
For our purposes the detailed log book is of great value. By dividing the
expenditures by the quantities, we know the individual prices at which the
household purchased the commodities.
So we have a price variation in our cross section that enables us to estimate
demand systems with data from only one year. In cases where the individual
price data is not available, an econometric estimation of a demand system
would only be possible by using time series of aggregated cross section data.
The time series approach is only feasible if an income and expenditure survey
is conducted every year, as it is the case in the US and the UK. The only
yearly survey available in Germany is the already mentioned LWR, which is
less detailed than the EVS and which is explicitly not recommended for any
time-series analysis.
Taking into account the above described data limitations, the demand
systems are estimated for nine staple foods listed in the detailed log book
of the EVS: Milk, cream, eggs, butter, margarine, apples, bananas, mineral
water and co¤ee. The choice of the specic commodities was driven by
several considerations. First, the level of commodity detail available in the
detailed log is very high. Second, the staple foods chosen are purchased by
the majority of the
households, so that a su¢ ciently large sample size is achieved without
making assumptions about the households with zero consumption of an item.
Third, the staple foods chosen are homogenous goods, without considerable
quality changes, new types appearing or wide di¤erences in product char-
acteristics. Fourth, food is purchased frequently which is not the case for
durables. Fifth, the food consumption is assumed to be separable from the
non-food consumption in consumers utility function, so that the cross price
reactions between food and non-food commodity groups should be rather
small. And nally the availability of absolute price data from the consumer
price statistic is also better for the food-, beverage- and tobacco-group than
for other commodity groups. To ensure the homogeneity of the consumers
analyzed, the socio-demographic variables of the EVS are used to include
only households in the sample that are consisting of couples with one or
more children younger than 18 years old.
For research purposes the research data centre of the GFSO provides so-
called Scientic-use-les containing household level micro data from the EVS.
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The micro-data is made anonymous by only making a 98% random sample
of all household les available and by a limitation of the number of variables
for which data is provided.43 The GFSO provided us with the Scientic-use-
les of the EVS for 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003. To calculate the COLI after
estimation of the demand systems, we use freely available price data out of
the GFSO consumer price statistics.
5 Estimation
The simplest way to estimate the parameters of a system of equations is
to estimate each equation separately by ordinary least square (OLS) tech-
niques. Here, this is not possible because of two reasons: First, we have
cross-equation parameter restrictions in The AIDS and QUAIDS, which can
only be tested if the equations were estimated simultaneously. Second, we
have to worry about contemporaneous correlation of the error terms that
would violate the OLS assumptions. Contemporaneous correlation of the
error terms occurs if the error terms of the N -budget share equations of one
household were correlated with each other. The probability for the occur-
rence of contemporaneous correlation is in our context very high. The error
terms of each of our budget share equations contains inuences such as demo-
graphic composition or income of the household on the budget shares which
are not yet included in the model by exogenous variables. As these inu-
ences typically vary between households but not within the specic budget
share equations of one household, contemporaneous correlation is likely to
occur. Nevertheless we conduct a Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test, to test our
data on contemporaneous correlation. The null hypothesis of freedom from
contemporaneous correlation has to be rejected for all data sets under consid-
eration. So we have to choose an estimation procedure that accounts for the
e¤ect of contemporaneous correlation and ensures the imposition of cross-
equation parameter restrictions. The nonlinearity of the AIDS and QUAIDS
additionally constrain the potential set of estimators. Following the well
known seemingly unrelated regression approach of [30]Zellner (1962), we use
a feasible generalized nonlinear least square estimator (FGNLS) proposed by
[9]Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
43We are very grateful to the GFSO for the provision of the Scientic-use-les and many
useful advices concerning the data set.
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As described in the previous section, we have four cross-section data sets
(EVS data from 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003) available for our AIDS and
QUAIDS estimation. For lack of space we cant display all estimation and test
results of the four data sets. Our focus will lay on the 1988 results, because
they enable us to calculate long COLI- time-series. A selection of output
tables can be found in the appendix of this paper, further results are available
upon request. After having estimated the AIDS and QUAIDS budget share
equations (34) and (42) using the EVS data set from 1988, 1993, 1998 and
2003, we rst want to test the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions. As
the fulllment of the symmetry restriction ensures also the fulllment of the
homogeneity restriction because otherwise the adding-up condition would be
violated, we have to estimate the AIDS and the QUAIDS once with only the
homogeneity restrictions imposed (model 2) and once completely without
any restrictions (model 3) imposed. Now we can calculate the Likelihood-
Ratio (LR) test statistic to compare the t of the unrestricted model (model
2 or model 3) and the restricted model (the primary model specication with
symmetry and homogeneity restrictions imposed, called model 1) which is a
special case of the other. As table 4 and table 5 show, the null hypotheses (the
restricted model has the same goodness of t as the unrestricted model) can
be rejected for the AIDS and the QUAIDS for all years (except for the 1993
QUAIDS comparison of model 1 and model 2) with a level of signicance
smaller than 0.05. This means that the observed household data sets are
not allowing the conclusion that the neoclassical assumptions of demand
functions that are homogeneous of degree 0 in prices and expenditure and
symmetric Slutsky matrices were fullled. So the behaviour of the households
is not free from money illusion and for the Hicks cross-price elasticities the
relation @qHi =@pj = @q
H
j =@pi is not valid.
To complete the test of the theoretical restrictions of the AIDS and
QUAIDS, we have to test the monotonicity condition, which requires a cost
function that is monotonically increasing in prices and the concavity condi-
tion that the cost function is concave. [10]Chalfant et al. (1991) show that
the monotonicity condition is fullled if the tted budget shares of all N -
goods of the model are laying in the interval between 0 and 1. Testing the
concavity condition is by far more complex. A cost function is concave at a
certain data point, if the matrix of the second-order derivatives of the cost
function the so called Slutsky matrix is negative semi-denite. Most of
the demand studies proof the negative semideniteness of the Slustky matrix
by only checking the sign of the diagonal elements of the Slustky matrix.
30
As [1]Alley et al. (1992) show, the non-positivity of the diagonal elements
of the Slustky matrix is only a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for
the negative semideniteness of the Slustky matrix. A necessary and suf-
cient condition for the negative semideniteness of the Slustky matrix is
the non-positiviy of all the eigenvalues of the matrix. An additional draw-
back of many demand studies is that the proof of negative semideniteness
of the Slustky matrix is only conducted at one data point, typically at the
mean of the price and expenditure observations. By contrast, we are calcu-
lating the eigenvalues of the Slutsky matrix at each data point of our sample.
Table 6 provides the percentage of observations which does not violate the
monotonicity and concavity conditions. The above described test of the con-
cavity condition is carried out both with the observed and the tted values of
the budget shares wi. On the rst view, the results of the concavity test dis-
play a broad rejection of the concavity condition. A closer inspection of the
particular eigenvalues reveals that for the wide majority of the observations
only one of the N -eigenvalues is not negative. So we can conclude similarly
to [1]Alley et al. (1992) that our cost functions have a weaklynon-concave
shape. The rejection of the symmetry, homogeneity and concavity condi-
tions for most of the estimated models is a clear sign that the households
didnt behave in the neoclassical way. This nding is in line with most of
the empirical demand analysis (as summarized for example by Cozzarin and
Gilmour (1998)) and was already expected by [11]Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980) when they formalized the AIDS. As already mentioned in the third
section, the AIDS is nested by the QUAIDS. So we can conduct a LR test
to see if the restricted model (AIDS) has the same goodness of t as the
unrestricted model (QUAIDS). Table 7 shows that for all four data sets the
null hypotheses, that the AIDS has the same goodness of t as the QUAIDS,
can be rejected on a level of signicance smaller than 0.05.
With the estimated parameters of the AIDS and QUAIDS for 1988 we
calculate COLI time series from 1988 to 2009. The expenditure of the repre-
sentative household to attain the cost of living can be calculated by inserting
the price data for the nine commodities out of the o¢ cial German consumer
price statistics from 1988 to 2009. For the same nine goods, a traditional
Laspeyres price index is calculated by using a weighting scheme obtained
from the 2581 household observations of 1988s EVS that we have used to
estimate the AIDS and QUAIDS. Table 8 presents the results of the AIDS-
and QUAIDS-COLI and the Laspeyres type CPI with base year 1988. To
compare our AIDS- and QUAIDS COLI with superlative index numbers, we
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calculate Fisher- and Törnqvist- price indices. As we need actual weighting
scheme informations for the Fisher- and Törnqvist- price index calculation,
we can only calculate index numbers for the three years with EVS data avail-
able. Table 8 and table 9 show, that not only the Laspeyres price index is
exceeding the two COLIs but also the Fisher- and Törnqvist- price index are
lying far above the two COLIs. These results are a strong drawback for the
superlative index approach.
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6 Conclusion
The result of the empirical part was that the demand systems estimated had
a poor goodness of t (table 3) which may possibly indicate the consump-
tion behaviour of households is not well explained by the usual assump-
tions of utility maximisation in microeconomics as they are materialised in
the demand systems. In particular the demand-system and the superlative-
index approach obviously dont t together satisfactorily. The Fisher- and
Törnqvist- price index index were consistently considerably lower than the
COLI based on a demand system for the same data. We also saw that many
tests for the assumptions of the respective models failed and many results
were such that they did not really make sense. It may be suggested that
these unsatisfactory ndings may perhaps be attributed to the specic Ger-
man data. Even if this were the case it is still true, that estimating a demand
system of more than only some few goods (N = 9 in our case) entails so many
insurmountable di¢ culties that it would by no means be a reasonable option
for o¢ cial statistics to compile a CPI based on estimated demand systems.
Thus a monthly COLI-type o¢ cial CPI based on estimated demand systems
comprising a tolerable variety of goods will most probably be impossible.
Even worse, there may be indications that the assumptions underlying the
often praised (alleged) microeconomic foundation of the COLI are unrealistic.
This can be inferred from the unsatisfactory t of our (demand) regression
equations. In the rst place we may conjecture that in reality households
can hardly respond so promptly and rapidly to price signals by substituting
as assumed in theory. Such theory related arguments should be kept in
mind when we consider the superlative-index approach next, because for this
approach to be valid it has to rely on the same assumptions (concerning
consumer behaviour) and to some more in addition (concerning the notion
of approximatingan arbitraryfunction).
As already mentioned in this situation it appears tempting to avoid all
those econometric di¢ culties with demand systems by simply calculating a
superlative index combining observable data vectors pt;p0;q0 and qt only
(where perhaps only the timely availability of qt may pose a problem in
practice). This, however, is not that easy. The proof of superlative-ness
of an index function requires the restrictive assumptions discussed in section
2 which are unlikely to hold empirically, and together with the assumptions
needed to relate the index to a utility maximum this makes the index no less
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dependent on restrictive and perhaps unrealistic assumptions than the much
simpler COGI approach.
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A Appendix
Table 1: AIDS estimates for 1988
coe¤. estimator standard errors t-stat p-value sig.1)
1 0.3478 0.0531 6.5600 0.0000 ***
2 -0.0072 0.0296 -0.2400 0.8080
3 0.2819 0.0336 8.3800 0.0000 ***
4 0.0996 0.0469 2.1200 0.0340 *
5 -0.0085 0.0185 -0.4600 0.6460
6 0.0388 0.0276 1.4100 0.1600
7 0.0292 0.0249 1.1700 0.24102
8 0.1645 0.0294 5.6000 0.0000 ***
9 0.0539 0.0627 0.8600 0.3900
1 0.0495 0.0084 5.8700 0.0000 ***
2 -0.0076 0.0045 -1.6800 0.0930 .
3 -0.0036 0.0046 -0.7700 0.4390
4 -0.0019 0.0062 -0.3000 0.7640
5 -0.0159 0.0027 -5.8900 0.0000 ***
6 0.0000 0.0059 0.0000 0.9990
7 -0.0124 0.0039 -3.1500 0.0020 **
8 -0.0093 0.0073 -1.2700 0.2030
9 0.0012 0.0090 0.1300 0.8970
11 0.1509 0.0227 6.6400 0.0000 ***
12 -0.0198 0.0097 -2.0500 0.0410 *
13 -0.0243 0.0095 -2.5600 0.0110 *
14 0.0192 0.0152 1.2700 0.2060
15 -0.0185 0.0059 -3.1600 0.0020 **
16 -0.0005 0.0087 -0.0600 0.9540
17 -0.0185 0.0080 -2.3100 0.0210
18 -0.0192 0.0086 -2.2300 0.0260 ***
19 -0.0693 0.0172 -4.0200 0.0000 ***
22 0.0130 0.0081 1.6200 0.1060
23 -0.0067 0.0056 -1.2000 0.2310
24 -0.0124 0.0089 -1.3900 0.1650
25 -0.0014 0.0035 -0.4000 0.6860
26 0.0052 0.0050 1.0500 0.2920
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27 -0.0059 0.0047 -1.2400 0.2150
28 0.0001 0.0047 0.0200 0.9850
29 0.0278 0.0096 2.8900 0.0040 **
33 0.0803 0.0077 10.3700 0.0000 ***
34 -0.0090 0.0086 -1.0500 0.2960
35 -0.0073 0.0035 -2.0900 0.0360 *
36 -0.0167 0.0049 -3.3800 0.0010 ***
37 -0.0026 0.0047 -0.5600 0.5750
38 -0.0107 0.0047 -2.2500 0.0250 *
39 -0.0032 0.0095 -0.3300 0.7390
44 -0.0018 0.0202 -0.0900 0.9300
45 0.0110 0.0056 1.9500 0.0510 .
46 0.0002 0.0071 0.0200 0.9820
47 -0.0040 0.0073 -0.5500 0.5810
48 -0.0080 0.0066 -1.2100 0.2250
49 0.0049 0.0146 0.3300 0.7390
55 0.0261 0.0031 8.4000 0.0000 ***
56 -0.0055 0.0030 -1.8500 0.0640 .
57 -0.0028 0.0029 -0.9700 0.3300
58 -0.0031 0.0028 -1.0900 0.2760
59 0.0016 0.0058 0.2700 0.7830
66 0.0154 0.0072 2.1400 0.0320 *
67 -0.0010 0.0042 -0.2300 0.8180
68 -0.0013 0.0053 -0.2400 0.8070
69 0.0042 0.0090 0.4600 0.6440
77 0.0330 0.0056 5.9300 0.0000 ***
78 -0.0080 0.0040 -1.9700 0.0490 *
79 0.0097 0.0080 1.2200 0.2210
88 0.0543 0.0082 6.6500 0.0000 ***
89 -0.0042 0.0089 -0.4700 0.6380
99 0.0285 0.0230 1.2400 0.2140
number of iterations: 3
1) level of signicance: . = 0.1, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001.
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Table 2: QUAIDS estimates for 1988
coe¤. estimator standard errors t-stat p-value sig.1)
1 0.3491 0.0523 6.6700 0.0000 ***
2 -0.0081 0.0296 -0.2700 0.7860
3 0.2811 0.0342 8.2100 0.0000 ***
4 0.0987 0.0465 2.1200 0.0340 *
5 -0.0095 0.0186 -0.5100 0.6120
6 0.0391 0.0276 1.4200 0.1570
7 0.0298 0.0248 1.2000 0.2300
8 0.1679 0.0291 5.7800 0.0000 ***
9 0.0518 0.0622 0.8300 0.4050 *
1 0.0610 0.0123 4.9600 0.0000 ***
2 -0.0075 0.0057 -1.3000 0.1940
3 -0.0109 0.0070 -1.5500 0.1210
4 -0.0090 0.0087 -1.0300 0.3010
5 -0.0209 0.0043 -4.8400 0.0000 ***
6 0.0009 0.0074 0.1200 0.9080
7 -0.0089 0.0053 -1.6800 0.0920 .
8 -0.0012 0.0102 -0.1200 0.9060
9 -0.0035 0.0116 -0.3000 0.7610
11 0.1470 0.0227 6.4800 0.0000 ***
12 -0.0209 0.0097 -2.1600 0.0310 *
13 -0.0225 0.0095 -2.3600 0.0180 *
14 0.0217 0.0152 1.4300 0.1530
15 -0.0178 0.0059 -3.0300 0.0020 **
16 -0.0005 0.0087 -0.0600 0.9510
17 -0.0193 0.0080 -2.4100 0.0160 *
18 -0.0185 0.0086 -2.1500 0.0310 *
19 -0.0692 0.0172 -4.0200 0.0000 ***
22 0.0129 0.0081 1.5900 0.1110
23 -0.0063 0.0056 -1.1200 0.2640
24 -0.0115 0.0089 -1.2900 0.1980
25 -0.0011 0.0035 -0.3000 0.7630
26 0.0052 0.0050 1.0500 0.2930
27 -0.0062 0.0047 -1.3000 0.1920
28 -0.0001 0.0047 -0.0100 0.9920
29 0.0278 0.0096 2.8800 0.0040 **
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33 0.0796 0.0077 10.2800 0.0000 ***
34 -0.0100 0.0086 -1.1600 0.2440
35 -0.0075 0.0035 -2.1800 0.0290 *
36 -0.0166 0.0049 -3.3800 0.0010 ***
37 -0.0022 0.0047 -0.4800 0.6310
38 -0.0110 0.0047 -2.3300 0.0200 *
39 -0.0034 0.0095 -0.3500 0.7230
44 -0.0039 0.0202 -0.1900 0.8460
45 0.0106 0.0056 1.8800 0.0610 .
46 0.0001 0.0071 0.0200 0.9860
47 -0.0035 0.0073 -0.4800 0.6290
48 -0.0086 0.0066 -1.2900 0.1970
49 0.0051 0.0146 0.3500 0.7250
55 0.0261 0.0031 8.4200 0.0000 ***
56 -0.0055 0.0030 -1.8500 0.0640 .
57 -0.0028 0.0029 -0.9400 0.3460
58 -0.0035 0.0028 -1.2300 0.2200
59 0.0015 0.0058 0.2600 0.7980
66 0.0154 0.0072 2.1500 0.0320 *
67 -0.0010 0.0042 -0.2300 0.8180
68 -0.0013 0.0053 -0.2400 0.8090
69 0.0041 0.0090 0.4600 0.6450
77 0.0329 0.0056 5.9100 0.0000 ***
78 -0.0078 0.0040 -1.9200 0.0550 .
79 0.0098 0.0080 1.2300 0.2170
88 0.0551 0.0082 6.7400 0.0000 ***
89 -0.0044 0.0089 -0.5000 0.6190
99 0.0286 0.0230 1.2500 0.2120
1 -0.0277 0.0155 -1.7900 0.0740 .
2 -0.0004 0.0085 -0.0500 0.9580
3 0.0176 0.0088 2.0000 0.0450 *
4 0.0174 0.0114 1.5200 0.1280
5 0.0119 0.0051 2.3500 0.0190 *
6 -0.0021 0.0109 -0.1900 0.8490
7 -0.0084 0.0073 -1.1400 0.2540
8 -0.0195 0.0135 -1.4500 0.1470
9 0.0113 0.0165 0.6800 0.4950
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number of iterations: 3
1) level of signicance: . = 0.1, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001.
Table 3: coe¢ cients of determination of the AIDS and QUAIDS estimation
for 1988
equation AIDS QUAIDS
w1 0.0839 0.0869
w2 0.0134 0.0131
w3 0.1002 0.1037
w4 0.0051 0.0073
w5 0.0991 0.1040
w6 0.0038 0.0039
w7 0.0464 0.0474
w8 0.0428 0.0444
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Table 4: LR test of the linear restrictions of the AIDS
model 1: symmetry and homogeneity restrictions
model 2: only homogeneity restrictions
model 3: no restrictions
Modell df1) log lik.2) ddf3) LR p-value sig.4)
1988 1 52 12,641.22
2 80 12,663.46 28 44.48 0.0249 **
1988 1 52 12,641.22
3 88 12,667.90 36 53.36 0.0312 **
1993 1 52 7,708.46
2 80 7,724.41 28 31.91 0.2782
1993 1 52 7,708.46
3 88 7,733.36 36 49.79 0.0629 *
1998 1 52 4,738.93
2 80 4,758.69 28 39.52 0.0729 *
1998 1 52 4,738.93
3 88 4,767.06 36 56.25 0.0170 **
2003 1 52 3,475.45
2 80 3,496.34 28 41.79 0.0454 **
2003 1 52 3,475.45
3 88 3,504.09 36 57.28 0.0135 **
1) degrees of freedom
2) log likelihood value
3) di¤erence between degrees of freedom of the two models
4) level of signicance: * = 0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01
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Table 5: LR test of the linear restrictions of the QUAIDS
model 1: symmetry and homogeneity restrictions
model 2: only homogeneity restrictions
model 3: no restrictions
Modell df1) log lik.2) ddf3) LR p-value sig.4)
1988 1 60 12,649.86
2 88 12,672.38 28 45.04 0.0219 **
1988 1 60 12,649.86
3 96 12,676.81 36 53.90 0.0280 **
1993 1 60 7,711.36
2 88 7,727.61 28 32.50 0.2548
1993 1 60 7,711.36
3 96 7,736.91 36 51.10 0.0491 **
1998 1 60 4,754.24
2 88 4,775.68 28 42.88 0.0358 **
1998 1 60 4,754.24
3 96 4,783.80 36 59.12 0.0089 ***
2003 1 60 3,494.32
2 88 3,516.31 28 43.98 0.0279 **
2003 1 60 3,494.32
3 96 3,523.93 36 59.22 0.0087 ***
1) degrees of freedom
2) log likelihood value
3) di¤erence between degrees of freedom of the two models
4) level of signicance: * = 0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01
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Table 6: percentage of observations not violating the monotonicity and con-
cavity conditions
data set model monotonicity concavity
tted oberserved
1988 AIDS 100% 0% 0%
QUAIDS 100% 0% 0%
1993 AIDS 100% 0.158% 0%
QUAIDS 100% 1.738% 0%
1998 AIDS 100% 7.635% 0.246%
QUAIDS 100% 5.665% 0.248%
2003 AIDS 100% 5.068% 1.351%
QUAIDS 100% 2.703% 3.378%
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Table 7: LR of the AIDS vs. the QUAIDS
model 1: AIDS with symmetry and homogeneity restrictions
model 2: QUAIDS with symmetry and homogeneity restrictions
Modell df1) log lik.2) ddf3) LR p-value sig.4)
1988 1 52 12,641.22
2 60 12,649.86 8 17.28 0.0273 **
1993 1 52 7,708.46
2 60 7,711.36 8 5.80 0.6696
1998 1 52 4,738.93
2 60 4,754.24 8 30.62 0.0001 ***
2003 1 52 3,475.45
2 60 3,494.32 8 37.74 0.0000 ***
1) degrees of freedom
2) log likelihood value
3) di¤erence between degrees of freedom of the two models
4) level of signicance: * = 0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01
45
Table 8: COLIs and Laspeyres-price index, base year 1988
Jahr AIDS QUAIDS Laspeyres
1988 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
1989 1.0037 1.0062 1.0185
1990 1.0075 0.9978 1.0396
1991 1.0109 0.9989 1.0615
1992 1.0131 1.0047 1.0710
1993 1.0099 0.9968 1.0526
1994 1.0200 1.0168 1.1064
1995 1.0249 1.0347 1.1319
1996 1.0247 1.0272 1.1320
1997 1.0287 1.0423 1.1536
1998 1.0371 1.0706 1.2024
1999 1.0293 1.0478 1.1568
2000 1.0369 1.0601 1.2017
2001 1.0436 1.0638 1.2437
2002 1.0428 1.0555 1.2401
2003 1.0413 1.0515 1.2323
2004 1.0396 1.0427 1.2236
2005 1.0436 1.0559 1.2475
2006 1.0466 1.0635 1.2662
2007 1.0576 1.0870 1.3322
2008 1.0688 1.1028 1.4142
2009 1.0552 1.0828 1.3269
Table 9: COLIs and superlative price indices, base year 1988
year Laspeyres Paasche Fisher Törnqvist AIDS QUAIDS
1993 1.0526 1.0566 1.0546 1.0547 1.0099 0.9968
1998 1.2024 1.2052 1.2038 1.2038 1.0371 1.0706
2003 1.2323 1.2562 1.2442 1.2439 1.0413 1.0515
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